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This paper presents an empirical investigation of how agricultural land ownership inequality
and government ideology (right-wing vs. left-wing) aﬀect agricultural protection. Theoretically,
the links are quite ambiguous, switching from positive to negative depending on the structure of
the underlying political economic model – i.e. pressure groups vs. median voter approach. The data
show, overall, that protection is decreasing in land inequality and with left-wing government ori-
entation, but not in a linear fashion: left-wing governments tend to support agriculture in more
unequal societies. There is some evidence that the relationship holds better in democracies than
in dictatorships.
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In the last decade problems of land inequality have attracted renewed interest in the
development literature due to the notion that inequality is economically costly (Deininger
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countries with unequal land distribution (Swinnen, 2002). However, few attempts have0306-9192/$ - see front matter  2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2006.03.009
* Tel.: +39 02 70600455; fax: +39 02 70638437.
E-mail address: alessandro.olper@unimi.it.
68 A. Olper / Food Policy 32 (2007) 67–83been made to analyze the link between land inequality and agricultural protection patterns
(see De Gorter and Swinnen, 2002 for a recent survey). More in general, the implication of
the distribution of assets ownership for trade protection is a much neglected aspect of the
current political economic literature (Mitra, 1999).
There could be two main reasons for this neglect. First, the role of inequality has often
been obfuscated in political economic studies because it was confused with that of group
size. Indeed, the tendency is to consider small groups as being eﬀective, largely because
their are homogeneous (Baland and Platteau, 1997).
The second reason is that the most political economic models of agricultural policy for-
mation consider interest groups to be exogenous, so that any analysis leaves out the eﬀect
of within-group heterogeneity (Barrett, 1999).1 However, it has been suggested that assets
inequality could have a substantial eﬀect on both collective action and government redis-
tribution, thus aﬀecting the provision of public goods (see Stiglitz, 1998; Bardhan et al.,
2001) and the social demand of the median voter (see Mayer, 1984; Alesina and Rodrik,
1994). This seems especially true at the agricultural level, where owning land gives diﬀerent
externality at both the economic (i.e. access to credit, risk propensity) and the socio-polit-
ical level (i.e. social status, political power).
Starting from these considerations, the aim of the paper has been to empirically inves-
tigate the relationship between land distribution inequality and patterns of agricultural
protection, taking into consideration also the potential role played by the ideological ori-
entation of the government. Indeed, in an unequal society, left-wing government may have
a strong rationale for redistribution and thus potentially aﬀect the interplay between
inequality and protection. The data strongly support these predictions. Speciﬁcally, con-
trolling for development, comparative advantage, agricultural sector size, and political
institutions, it will be shown that protection is decreasing in land inequality and with
left-wing government orientation, but not in a linear fashion: left-wing governments tend
to support agriculture in more unequal economies.
The main contribution of the paper is to add to the empirical literature on cross-coun-
try variation in agricultural protection. Speciﬁcally, the results uncover a robust empirical
regularity in the relationship between agricultural protection, land inequality and govern-
ment ideology. That these relationships are not without interest is documented by recent
papers that have started studying, both theoretically and empirically, the interplay
between these dimensions in the context of endogenous trade policy.
The ﬁrst message from this literature is the suggestion that the interplay between
inequality and protection is often ambiguous (see Pecorino, 1998; Magee, 2002) and
is strongly linked to the assumption of the underlying political economic model (see
Dutt and Mitra, 2002). A second message suggests that because trade policy depends
not only on the extent to which the government wants to redistribute income, but also
on the country’s overall factor endowments and their redistribution, both the partisan
nature of the government – i.e. whether it is pro-rural or pro-capital – and assets
inequality, could aﬀect trade policy determination (Dutt and Mitra, 2003). The paper
gives a preliminary assessment of this prediction in the context of agricultural trade
policy.1 Exceptions to this rule can be found in De Janvry et al. (1989), Binswanger and Deininger (1997) and Barrett
(1999).
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section brieﬂy analyses how the literature accounts for the link between assets inequality,
government ideology and protection, with special emphasis being given to agricultural
policy. Data and basic speciﬁcation section describes the data and basic speciﬁcation.
Econometric methodology and results section presents the empirical strategy and the
results. At the end there is a brief discussion of the results and some concluding
comments.Theory and previous evidences
A brief account of the theoretical and the empirical literature on the link between assets
inequality, government orientation and trade protection is given. The focus is on two main
strands of the literature, namely the literature on endogenous trade policies and that on
assets inequality and collective action.
Inequality and endogenous protection
In recent political economic models, the relationship between assets inequality and
income distribution has often been based on the Downsian, median voter, framework
(see Alesina and Rodrik, 1994). Within this framework the degree of inequality tends to
have a positive inﬂuence on the degree of redistribution, regardless of who governs.2
However, the median-voter approach within a Heckshcer–Ohlin framework predicts
that any increase in assets inequality, holding constant the economy’s overall relative
endowments, raises trade barriers in capital-rich countries and lowers them in labor-abun-
dant economies (Mayer, 1984). Dutt and Mitra (2002) found considerable empirical sup-
port for this prediction in a large cross-section of countries.
One key feature of the above result is the recognition that governments, in setting trade
policies, give considerable weight to general-interest rather than to special-interest
groups.3 However, the applicability of this reasoning to agricultural protection is not so
straightforward. In fact, agricultural policy, especially in the developed world, is probably
one of the clearer examples of special-interest politics, where policy decisions create con-
centrated beneﬁts for a few well-deﬁned groups. Moreover, analyzing the eﬀect of land
inequality within a Heckscher–Ohlin framework is not very meaningful.
However, if we depart from the median voter approach and go to the prediction of lob-
bying models, we do not ﬁnd clear predictions on the link between assets inequality and
trade protection.
For example, Pecorino (1998) focuses on lobby formation, and tariﬀs are assumed to be
an increasing function of campaign contributions. In this setting he shows that there is no
presumption that an increase in concentration overcomes the free-rider problems, and this
can lead to ambiguity in the link between industry concentration and tariﬀs. On the other
hand, Mitra (1999) assumes that an interest group forms only if the generated rents are2 However, this prediction is quite inconsistent with the data (see, Deininger and Squire, 1998, and the papers
cited therein).
3 Similar conclusions were found by Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000) in
testing the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model on the US protection structure.
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degree of inequality in assets distribution may result in the formation of a larger number
of lobbies, suggesting a positive link between inequality and tariﬀs. Finally, Magee (2002)
extends the work of Pecorino (1998) and shows that the relationship between concen-
tration, free riding and trade protection changes under diﬀerent parameter conditions,
leading to linearly increasing or decreasing relationships, or even non-monotonic ones,
between concentration, free riding and tariﬀs.
The literature on lobby activities and tariﬀ formation is related to the more general
problem of the collective action and public goods provision. Thus, to gain new insight,
and avoid the ambiguity of the above results, let us look at the recent literature on assets
inequality and collective action.
Inequality and collective action
Is group participation higher or lower in more unequal communities? The literature
addresses this question in diﬀerent and contrasting ways. Starting from the seminal con-
tributions of Olson (1965), and Bergstrom et al. (1986) who, respectively, predicted a posi-
tive and a neutral eﬀect of income inequality on public goods provision, the recent
literature has stressed the possibility of a negative impact of increased inequality on the
collective action (see Baland and Platteau, 1997 for a survey).
The traditional argument of Olson is that if inequality leads to the emergence of one
dominant player, then such dominance could alleviate collective action problems through
the internalisation of the externalities.4 However, Baland and Platteau (1997) stressed that
when assessing the impact of inequality on the success of collective action, two contrasting
eﬀects are at work. On the one hand, there is Olson’s argument discussed above, while on
the other hand, it has been shown that increased inequality can lead to less collective
action when free-rider problems get worse for the poor and the set of contributors shrinks
substantially. Thus, the net eﬀect of inequality on collective action depends crucially on the
relative strengths of these two contrasting eﬀects. The same authors stress that this ‘neu-
trality result’ holds true only under quite restrictive conditions, reducing its relevance in
many realistic applications.
Bardhan et al. (2001) depart from these limitations, showing that when there are market
imperfections in input that are complementary to the collective goods, the relationship
between increased inequality and collective action (and eﬃciency) will be negative for pub-
lic goods and inverse U-shaped for common property resources (CPR).
This negative link hypothesis is supported by limited, but growing, empirical literature
on assets (land) inequality and collective action. For example, studies based on micro-level
survey data have reported a close negative association between farmers’ inequality in land
ownership and their ability to resolve collective action problems, such as the forming of
water management organizations (Easter and Palanisami, 1986), co-operating in water
allocation (Bardhan, 2000; Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson, 2002), and participating in
groups like co-operatives, rotating savings and credit associations (La Ferrara, 2002).
Thus, if an individual’s incentive to join a group is aﬀected by heterogeneity in assets4 Van Bastelaer (1998) found some support for this positive eﬀect of land inequality on agricultural protection,
by using the number of holdings per agricultural worker, as proxy for land distribution.
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inequality and agricultural protection.
In the context of agricultural policy formation, two recent papers considered interest
groups to be endogenous. Indeed, Barrett (1999) analyzes the economic incentives of coali-
tions for food price policy, recognizing the heterogeneity of interests across households.
He shows that, other things being constant, household land holdings per capita is a factor
aﬀecting both the formation of groups and their alignment on food price policy. Thus,
because unequal land distribution reinforces the number of net farm buyers who act in
favor of low price policies, his model predicts a negative link between land inequality
and protection.
More generally, Binswanger and Deininger (1997) highlighted three main channels
through which land inequality could aﬀect agricultural policy. First of all, land inequality
reduces the participation of the poor in the political process, both directly and indirectly.
This, in turn, reduces the likelihood of the poor having access to education and health care
services, reinforcing their collective action problems. Finally, inequality might hinder the
establishment of independent and impartial institutions, and the enforcement of binding
rules.
Casual observation seems to ﬁt in quite well with this negative link hypothesis. For
example, agricultural price protection in East and Southeast Asia emerged only after strong
land reform (Binswanger and Deininger, 1997). By contrast, in many African countries
and, especially, in Latin America, strong inequality in land distribution has often been asso-
ciated with direct and indirect agricultural policy taxation (see Krueger et al., 1991).
Government ideology and trade policy
Till now we have left out the possibility that the response of redistributive trade policy
to land inequality diﬀers, depending on the kind of government in power. However, if pol-
iticians are ‘partisan’ – left-wing and right-wing governments have diﬀerent objective func-
tions – then the interplay between land inequality and protection could also be related to
the ideological orientation of the government.
In fact, the Stolper–Samuelson theorem tends to suggest that trade politics could be
class politics because political parties tend to be aﬃliated with particular economic classes.
If this is the case, then trade policy may become an issue for the partisan competition. For
instance, in America in the 19th century, the Democrats supported by farmers pushed for
free trade, while the Republicans aligned with manufacturers and workers advocated pro-
tection (see Hiscox, 2002).
The literature gives several deﬁnitions and interpretations of the term ideology. For
example, a view is that it stands for the self-deﬁned notions of public interest and altruistic
goals of political parties, which form the basis for most economic policy making (Kau and
Rubin, 1979). Diﬀerently, other authors suggest that the interests of constituents and ideo-
logical preferences of politicians are interrelated, with the former probably determining
the later (Peltzman, 1984).
Our objective is to analyze whether agricultural policy is aﬀected by the ideological
orientation of the government, and this is independent of which kind of ideology deﬁ-
nition one adopted. Thus, following the classical treatment in political economic models,
we simply assumes that politicians care about the well being of particular groups in soci-
ety, irrespective of the (true) underlying reasons. For example, left-wing governments
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attach a high weight on altruistic and egalitarian goals (see Dutt and Mitra, 2005, on
this point).5
A ﬁrst test of a partisan ideology-based model in the context of trade policy, was carried
out by Dutt and Mitra (2005). They show that left-wing (right-wing) governments tend to
adopt more (less) protectionist trade policies in capital rich countries, but adopt more
(less) pro-trade policies in labor rich economies. However, to the best of my knowledge,
there have been no direct tests of the partisan theory on agricultural trade policy determi-
nation, although some indirect and partial evidence can be found in the work of Bates
(1983). In studying the patterns of market intervention in agrarian Africa, Bates found
some support for a quite counter intuitive hypothesis, namely ‘that despite their stress
on economic equality, socialist governments should be more likely than others to impose
lower prices on the commodity from which the poorest of the poor – the peasant farmers –
derive their incomes’ (1983: p. 299). Taken literally, Bates’ result could suggest a negative
link between left-wing government orientation and agricultural protection and support. A
more profound test of this ‘partisan hypothesis’, taking care also of the potential interplay
between ideology and inequality, will be given later.
Data and basic speciﬁcation
To test the contrasting hypotheses summarized above on the link between protection,
land inequality and ideology, use is made of data on agricultural protection and support
from about 40 countries, covering all continents and diﬀerent levels of development (see
Appendix A.1 for the full country sample and the time period covered). The time dimen-
sion of the data spans from 1982 to 2000, but not every country has the full coverage of the
time period. The country’ average time period is equal to 14 years, with a minimum of 6
years, resulting in a quite unbalanced dataset. Overall, we have from 483 to 433 observa-
tions, depending on the speciﬁcation. The main limiting factor are the protection data,
followed by ideology.
Land inequality and ideology variables
Our key independent variables are a measure of land inequality and of the ideological
orientation of the government (left, center and right wing).
The initial Gini index (circa 1980) of the operational agricultural land holdings, land-
gini, is the proxy for inequality in land distribution. The information on initial land Gini
come from IFAD (2001, Tab. 3.1), Keefer and Knack (1995) and FAO sources. The homo-
geneity of these data is a major advantage; in fact all are based on the oﬃcial decennial
FAO World Census of Agriculture. Moreover, while this proxy is not immune to measure-
ment problems – referring to operational activity rather than land ownership – Deininger
and Squire (1998) suggested that such data constitute a lower bound to land ownership
inequality in that the rental market contributes to a more equal distribution of land5 The Partisan theory has been an important ﬁeld of empirical research at the macroeconomic level, studying
how the ideological orientation of governments inﬂuences unemployment, inﬂation and various monetary and
ﬁscal policy instruments. (see Alesina et al., 1997).
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able, these authors ﬁnd that the share of rented land was below 10% and the Gini coeﬃ-
cient for the distribution of operated land was lower than the Gini coeﬃcient of owned
land.
The data on the political orientation of the government are taken from the Database on
Political Institution (DPI) described in Beck et al. (2001). Starting from this database and
following Dutt and Mitra (2005), we constructed a cardinal measure of government ideol-
ogy for each country and each year, gov_ideology, equal to 1 for right, 2 for centre and 3 for
left ideology orientation. The measure is based on the ideological orientation of the chief
executive for a political system classiﬁed as ‘presidential’ in the database, the ideological
orientation of the largest government party for systems classiﬁed as ‘parliamentary’, and
the average of these two orientations for systems classiﬁed as ‘assembly-elected president’.
The gov_ideology variable was used considering both its time variation and its average
value over each country time period. However, the results reported below are based only
on the former speciﬁcation as they are totally unaﬀected by these diﬀerent manipulations.
Moreover, in the sensitivity analysis, we also experiment some manipulation aimed at tak-
ing care of the potential shortcoming in the international comparability of ideology
measure.
Finally, note that for a few not democratic countries in our sample, the DPI database
does not report data concerning government orientation. Thus, in regressions that include
ideology as an explanatory variable, the country sample is reduced from 40 to 34 countries.
Dependent variable and other controls
The dependent variable is the aggregated producer subsidy equivalent, pse, expressed as
the percentage of gross farm income taken fromOECD andUSDA sources. It measures the
percentage of farm income that comes from all government programs. The pse includes
border measures, output subsidies and direct payments as well as primary and intermediate
input subsidies, structural policies and the eﬀect of indirect macroeconomic policies like an
overvalued exchange rate. The advantage of using the pse is twofold: ﬁrst of all, measuring
the level of total income transfer from consumer/taxpayer to the agricultural sector,
appears a good proxy to test political economy hypotheses; secondly, it is available for a
quite large cross-section of countries.
As suggested by several previous studies (e.g., Beghin and Kherallah, 1994; Swinnen
et al., 2000, 2001; Olper, 2001) a number of additional economic and political variables
are likely to aﬀect the level of agricultural protection. These additional determinants
can be divided into two main broad categories: structural controls and political institution
variables.
As structural controls we include, ﬁrstly, two agricultural comparative advantage prox-
ies, landpc and expshr. The ﬁrst one is based on FAO data and measures the amount of
agricultural land per capita.6 The second one, expshr, measures the share of agricultural
export to total export, and comes from the World Bank World Development Indicators.6 In our context the inclusion of landpc is of particular interest in order to avoid our land inequality proxy
suﬀering systematic bias, due to the fact that more land abundant countries tend to have a consistently more
unequal distribution of land.
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ﬁrst two measure the agricultural share in employment and in GDP, and are respective
proxies for the relative group size and ‘vast interest’ in agriculture. Instead, gdppc is the
log of GDP per capita to control for the so-called ‘development paradox’, capturing resid-
ual diﬀerences in development. All the variables were computed from FAO and World
Bank sources.
Protection is also aﬀected by political institutions that determine the decision-making
framework, conditioning the ability of interest groups to shape public policies, and the
agency problems between voters and politicians. Recent studies have shown that any
increase in democracy aﬀects protection positively, although not linearly (Beghin and Khe-
rallah, 1994; Swinnen et al., 2000). Moreover, other institutional dimensions, such as the
quality of institutions that protects and enforces property rights (Olper, 2001), and diﬀer-
ences in electoral rules and forms of government (Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Henning,
2004; Olper and Raimondi, 2004) have been shown to matter a great deal in explaining
policy outcomes and protection.
Here, political institutions are controlled by means of two diﬀerent variables: the Gastil
index of political rights (an inverse measure of democracy), compiled by Freedom House,
and a composite index of quality of institution, icrg, based on data collected from the
International Country Risk Guide, a private international investment risk service. The polit-
ical rights proxy is a subjective index that classiﬁes countries into 7 categories, from the
best (1) to the worst (7), on the basis of several dimensions such as the existence of free
and fair elections, the right to participate in the political process, and so on. On the con-
trary, the icrg variable is based on ﬁve diﬀerent dimensions – rule of law, government repu-
diation, risk of expropriation, quality of bureaucracy and corruption in government – and
it is included both linearly and as the square, on the ground of previous results, showing a
strong inverted U-shaped relationship of this proxy with protection (see Olper, 2001).
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the explanatory variables described above.
Econometric methodology and results
The econometric model is based on variations of the following general empirical
equation:Table 1
Descriptive statistics
Minimum Mean Maximum Standard deviation Observed Countries
pse 242.7 20.5 77.2 40.9 483 40
landgini 21.1 61.3 97.0 17.7 489 40
gov_ideology 1.0 2.1 3.0 1.0 434 34
gdppc (log) 5.0 8.7 10.8 1.4 489 40
empshr 2.0. 25.1 85.4 24.7 485 40
agshr 1.4 10.7 57.0 10.5 489 40
expshr 0.3 17.4 81.8 19.1 485 40
landpc 0.3 64.1 1091.5 198.9 489 40
political rigths 1.0 2.6 7.0 1.9 485 40
icrg 10.3 36.9 50.0 11.4 485 40
icrgsq 106.1 1486.8 2500.0 780.3 485 40
Notes: See text for variables description.
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where yit is the level of agricultural protection in country i in year t; a is a common inter-
cept; dr and /t are regional-speciﬁc intercepts and time dummies, respectively; xit is the
vector of structural and institutional controls described above; landgini and gov_ideology
are the key variables of interest; b, g and ci denote the unknown parameters to be esti-
mated, while uit is an unobserved error term.
Using Eq. (1) let us test two main sets of hypotheses. First of all, we want to establish
whether protection is inﬂuenced directly by land inequality and ideology. Finding coeﬃ-
cients c0 6¼ 0 and g 6¼ 0, suggests a direct, or linear, eﬀect of land inequality and ideology
on agricultural protection. Secondly, we want to know whether the eﬀect of land inequality
is conditional to the ideological orientation of the government or, diﬀerently, whether it is
the eﬀect of ideology that switches in sign under diﬀerent inequality conditions. In this case,
ﬁnding coeﬃcients c0 6¼ c1 suggests that the eﬀect of land inequality (ideology) on policy
outcomes will depend on the value of government ideology (inequality). Then, studying
the sign of the partial derivatives of protection with respect to inequality and ideology,
respectively, we can assess endogenously from the data which kind of relationship holds.
Eq. (1) is ﬁrst estimated by ordinary least squares. Then, to check the robustness of our
results, we use both instrumental variable techniques and weighted least squares (WLS), to
take into account the potential endogenity issues and the unbalanced structure of the panel.
Regression results
Table 2 shows the pooled regression estimates. The estimation is by ordinary least
squares, and each regression always includes a set of comprehensive regional ﬁxed eﬀects
and a set of time dummies (not shown). Regression (1) is our baseline speciﬁcation, thus it
omits both the land inequality and the ideology variables that, instead, are included in the
successive speciﬁcations. Let us start by giving a brief account of the baseline results.
Generally speaking, the results strongly conﬁrm, using a larger data set, the previous
ﬁndings on the determinants of agricultural protection. First of all, the model as a whole
is highly signiﬁcant, and explains a large fraction of the cross-country and time-series vari-
ations in protection (adj R2 = 0.56). All the control variables enter the equation with their
expected signs, and are, for the most part, signiﬁcant at the 1% or 5% level.
Speciﬁcally, protection increases in countries with a comparative disadvantage in agri-
culture. Protection is related negatively with the relative dimension of the agricultural sec-
tor, measured by the employment share, but the relation is positive and signiﬁcant when
the economic size of agriculture is measured as the share of GDP. Moreover, protection
increases weakly with democracy, but shows a strong inverse U-shaped pattern with the
subjective index of the extent of maintenance institution quality. Finally, in terms of regio-
nal ﬁxed eﬀects we ﬁnd that, conditional to previous explanatory variables, agricultural
protection is lower in African countries and higher in Asian and European countries.
Regression (2) adds to our ‘benchmark’ the ﬁrst key variable of interest, inequality in
agricultural land measured as the Gini index. The land Gini enters the equation with a
negative and highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient (p-value > 0.01), showing that protection
decreases in countries with high inequality in land distribution. These results cast some
doubt on the ﬁndings of Van Bastelaer (1998), who shows a positive association between
Table 2
Land inequality, ideology and protection: regression results
Variables Dependent variable PSE%
Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Eq. (3) Eq. (4)
Coeﬃcient t-values Coeﬃcient t-values Coeﬃcient t-values Coeﬃcient t-values
gdppc 19.96 4.69 18.68 4.44 22.68 5.08 22.91 5.31
empshr 0.32 1.89 0.36 2.14 0.56 2.89 0.42 2.19
agshr 2.31 6.85 2.17 6.47 3.04 7.92 3.01 8.11
expshr 0.56 5.12 0.37 3.11 0.59 4.61 0.53 4.31
landpc 0.02 2.40 0.01 1.31 0.01 1.28 0.01 1.34
political rights 1.23 1.14 1.84 . 1.71 3.68 3.37 3.62 3.43
icrg 4.77 4.34 4.48 4.13 5.29 4.39 5.48 4.71
icrgsq 0.06 3.58 0.06 3.39 0.08 4.17 0.08 4.38
landgini 0.43 3.65 0.78 6.14 1.83 8.01
gov_ideology 4.62 3.01 31.81 6.11
landgini*
gov_ideology
0.43 5.45
Regional dummies
d_lam 4.35 0.61 6.60 0.93 13.02 2.08 17.90 2.62
d_asia 11.72 2.00 4.49 0.74 3.93 0.57 17.34 2.82
d_afr 12.59 1.93 11.94 1.86 6.38 0.88 0.21 0.03
d_nam 1.10 0.20 1.98 0.37 7.08 1.08 8.66 1.67
d_ceec 13.24 1.77 17.06 2.29 0.53 0.10 29.47 3.87
d_eur 13.59 2.04 11.62 1.76 6.21 0.92 11.37 1.80
d_paciﬁc 3.73 0.40 2.49 0.27 20.36 2.05 22.38 2.54
# Obs 483 483 433 433
Adj R2 0.56 0.57 0.59 0.62
F-statistic 19.41 19.76 18.75 20.37
Notes: OLS regressions. All equations include also a set of year dummies (see text).
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cussed above.7 On the contrary, the results support the view that inequality in assets own-
ership among group members may cause collective action problems of various types, as
suggested by, among others, Bardhan et al. (2001) and La Ferrara (2002).
The inclusion of land Gini does not substantially aﬀect other regression coeﬃcients.
The main changes with respect to our ‘benchmark’ are related to the comparative advan-
tage proxies. Now the land per capita variable loses its signiﬁcance,8 while the (absolute)
value of agricultural export share coeﬃcient is lower but still highly signiﬁcant.
Next, regression (3) adds the ideology of government as an explanatory variable to the
previous speciﬁcation. As can be seen, the gov_ideology coeﬃcient is negative and highly
signiﬁcant (p-value > 0.01). Because our ideology proxy increases with a left orientation, a7 Olper (2003) has shown that the positive link between land inequality and agricultural protection obtained in
Van Bastelaer (1998) is a combination of two main shortcomings: the poor land inequality proxy used there
(holdings per agricultural worker) and the failure to control for political institutions.
8 The fact that our land inequality proxy is strongly signiﬁcant, also in the presence of the agricultural land per
person active in agriculture, suggests that landgini does not suﬀer from systematic bias, due to the fact that more
abundant countries tend to have a consistently more unequal land distribution.
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left to the right of the political spectrum. Thus, the data show that, in agriculture,
right-wing governments are more protectionist than left-wing governments. These results
conﬁrm and extend the ﬁndings of Bates (1983) on the patterns of market intervention in
agrarian Africa, where he showed that ideology matters in setting food price policy.
The inclusion of the government ideology proxy aﬀects the coeﬃcients of some key
explanatory variables. Speciﬁcally, comparing the results of regression (2) with regression
(3), it can be seen that the coeﬃcients of land Gini and political rights (our inverse index of
democracy) increase in their absolute magnitude, and are now estimated with more
precision.
The last columns of Table 2 directly test the possibility that the response of redis-
tributive trade policy to land inequality and ideology is conditional to the interaction
between these two variables. For example, one can suppose that if politicians are par-
tisan, then in an unequal society a left-wing government could have a strong rationale
for redistribution, potentially aﬀecting the ideology-protection relationship. To this end,
regression (4) includes in the speciﬁcation also the interaction between land Gini and
government ideology (landgini*gov_ideology), removing the restriction from Eq. (1) that
c0 = c1.
9
The results are quite interesting. First, the interaction term is positive and strongly sig-
niﬁcant. At the same time the (absolute) linear coeﬃcients of both the land Gini and the
ideology variables increase substantially in magnitude and signiﬁcance. To better under-
stand these relationships, we have used the results of regression (4) to study the sign of
the partial derivatives of protection with respect to inequality and ideology. In the ﬁrst
case we have, opse/olandgini = 1.83 + 0.43*gov_ideology, which is negative at all levels
of the ideology values (gov_ideology 6 3). Diﬀerently, in the second case we have, opse/
ogov_ideology = 31.81 + 0.43*landgini, which is negative (positive) for landgini values
below (above) 74 (= 31.81/0.43) Gini points, that represent the land inequality turning
point. Note that, while this number is somewhat higher than the median (60.2) and the
mean (61.6) of the land Gini distribution, it lies largely within its range.
Summing up, the data show that land inequality aﬀects protection negatively, although
this negative eﬀect appears mitigated on passing from right-wing to left-wing government
orientation. Instead, left-wing government orientation – that, on average, tends to tax
agriculture – in a more unequal society tends to protect it. Interestingly, very similar
results were obtained by Lee and Roemer (2002) in studying the relationship between
income inequality and redistribution at the aggregate level.
Finally, it could be interesting to check whether our relationship holds up better in
democracy than in dictatorship, or vice-versa. Indeed, one can think that the government
response to lobbying may be stronger in democracy than in dictatorship. To see this, we
borrow the simple method used by Dutt and Mitra (2002), and regress the absolute resid-
ual of regression (4) on our inverse index of democracy, plus a constant. The results are as
follows (t-value are shown in parentheses, under the coeﬃcients):9 We have also tried interaction terms between land inequality with democracy and/or GDP per-capita, on the
grounds that democracies (or more developed countries) might be more responsive to demand for redistribution.
In some speciﬁcations these interactions turn out to be signiﬁcant. However, their signiﬁcance always disappears
when the (preferred) landgini*gov_ideology interaction is included in the speciﬁcation.
78 A. Olper / Food Policy 32 (2007) 67–83jpse residualj ¼ 8:83
ð6:95Þ
 þ 2:98
ð6:77Þ
ðpolitical rightsÞ R2 ¼ 0:10:
Because the political rights variable increases in the extent of dictatorship, its positive coef-
ﬁcient means that larger absolute residuals are positively correlated with less democracy.
Thus, there is some evidence that our model works better in democracies than in
dictatorships.10
Robustness checks
In this section we brieﬂy take into account the main potential econometric problems of
the results presented above. A ﬁrst problem can be derived from endogeneity issues in
some of the explanatory variables, leading to simultaneity bias. In general terms, our
key variables of interest – landgini and gov_ideology – are not aﬀected, for diﬀerent and
quite intuitive reasons, by changes in agricultural protection. However, it can be argued
that in countries with high levels of asset inequality left-wing governments have higher
chances of being elected. If this is the case, then political ideology is endogenous with
respect to the level of land inequality. However this argument is not supported by the data.
Indeed the correlation between left-wing government and land inequality is close to zero
(0.08).11
Next, as discussed in Beghin and Kherallah (1994) and Swinnen et al. (2001), causality
problems can exist for other explanatory variables such as empshr, agshr and expshr that
could, themselves, be aﬀected by agricultural protection. Thus, following previous studies,
we performed a Granger causality test for the above three variables with respect to the
independent pse variable. The tests reject the causality hypothesis for agshr and expshr
but not for empshr. Therefore, we performed a two stage least squares estimation, where
we employed fertility rate and pse lagged one year as instruments for empshr. Moreover,
because the Granger causality test is not robust against monotonic transformation (see
Swinnen et al., 2001), we also use as instruments for agshr and expshr, their (2 years)
lagged values. The results are reported in regression (1) of Table 3. As can be seen, the
parameter estimates suggest that our results and conclusions are not aﬀected to any degree
by endogenity issues.
Another possible econometric problem could derive from the unbalanced nature of our
data set. Speciﬁcally, the length of each country panel is systematically larger for devel-
oped countries than for developing countries (see Appendix A.1). Thus, our previous
OLS results are driven more by observations of developed countries, and this can be a
problem because our key variable of interest, landgini, displays only cross-country
variation.
To take into account this potential econometric issue, use was made of weighted least
squares estimation method, where each country’s weight is proportional to the length of its
panel. The results of the WLS regression are shown in regression (2) of Table 3, and they
are essentially unchanged with respect to OLS regression. Indeed, the coeﬃcient of land-10 We have also run regressions with additional interaction terms between ideology and democracy and between
ideology, land Gini and democracy. However both interaction terms turn out to be insigniﬁcant.
11 As a further check we regress ideology on land Gini, and then the residuals of this regression are used as a
proxy for ideology in the model. By doing so, the results are totally unaﬀected.
Table 3
Land inequality, ideology and protection: robustness checks
Variables Dependent variable PSE (%)
Eq. (1) Eq. (2) Eq. (3)
Coeﬃcient t-values Coeﬃcient t-values Coeﬃcient t-values
gdppc 20.63 3.33 29.48 5.23 22.85 5.79
empshr 0.67 1.68 0.40 1.82 0.16 0.88
agshr 3.63 8.56 3.44 9.22 3.07 8.96
expshr 0.50 3.63 0.61 4.85 0.56 4.84
landpc 0.01 1.46 0.02 1.14 0.02 1.73
political rights 4.02 3.57 7.97 6.34 2.52 2.57
icrg 6.16 5.25 6.02 4.49 6.22 5.74
icrgsq 0.08 4.62 0.10 4.26 0.08 5.05
landgini 1.97 8.81 2.52 7.90 2.60 12.52
gov_ideology 33.40 6.22 47.01 6.65 37.79 11.00
landgini * gov_ideology 0.46 5.71 0.65 6.28 0.54 10.21
Regional dummies Yes Yes Yes
# Observed 400 433 433
Adj R2 0.64 0.53 0.68
F-statistic 21.18 15.96 26.12
Notes: Eq. (1) is estimated via 2SLS, using as instruments the fertility rate and the pse lagged one year for empshr,
and agshr and expshr lagged two years instead of their contemporaneous values. Eq. (2) is estimated via WLS,
with weights proportional to the length of each country panel. Eq. (3) is a simple OLS regression, where the
gov_ideology variable has been adjusted to take into account its international comparability (see text). All
equations include a set of year dummies.
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signiﬁcance.
A ﬁnal potential weakness of our results could be due to the international comparabil-
ity of the ideology measure (see Dutt and Mitra, 2005). In fact, it can be argued that a left-
wing party in one country could be regarded as centrist or right-wing in another country.
For example, the ‘ideology’ of a leftist North American party is probably quite diﬀerent
from the ‘ideology’ of a leftist European party. In general terms, the regressions presented
above could be quite robust to this problem as they always include a very comprehensive
set of regional ﬁxed-eﬀect dummies. In fact, it is quite plausible that countries from the
same region have more similar notions of left/right ideology.
However, to be on the safe side, we further checked the robustness of the results by
adjusting country- and region-speciﬁc variation in the ideology deﬁnition, as suggested
by Dutt and Mitra (2005). These adjustments are based on a larger magnitude of the
left/right scale, now spanning from 1 (most right oriented) to 5 (most left oriented).12
As can be seen from the last regression of Table 3, the results are very robust to this
manipulation. In fact, the ideology and land inequality coeﬃcients (and their interaction)
are now estimated with more precision (higher t-values), the explanatory power of the12 The main adjustments are as follows: For the US the ideology scale remains the same (1 = Republicans,
3 = Democrats); for Latin America right = 1, centre = 3 and left = 5; for China left = 5; for Europe, UK and
Ireland retained the original coding, while the others recoded as right = 2, centre = 3 and left = 4.
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land inequality turning point is now lower (69.9 = 37.79/0.54), thus much closer to the
mean and the median of the landgini distribution.Discussion and conclusions
In this paper it is investigated empirically how inequality in land distribution aﬀects
the patterns of agricultural protection, taking into consideration the role played by the
ideological orientation of the government. Theoretically, these links are quite ambiguous,
switching from positive to negative depending on the underlying political economic
structure. For instance, models based on the median voter approach suggest a positive link
between assets inequality and government redistribution regardless of who governs, while
the prediction of lobby models suggests both negative and positive or even non-monotonic
relationships.
The data and results show that agricultural protection decreases with both land
inequality and left-wing government orientation, but not in a linear fashion. Indeed left-
wing governments – that, on average, tax agriculture – tend to protect it in more unequal
society. The underlying reason could be that in countries with strong unequal land distri-
bution the demand for redistribution of the median voter tends to overlap the partisan
interest of the government, if a left-wing government is in oﬃce. Thus, while our empirical
evidence is inconsistent with a pure median-voter approach, it also appears that elements
of general-interest politics are at work in driving the results.
Overall, the data support the more recent literature on assets inequality and collective
action, where inequality among members of a group can produce diﬀerent types of collec-
tive action problems, reducing co-operation and the provision of public goods. At the
same time, however, the results strongly support the idea that policy determination is also
driven by the partisan nature of the government: ideology orientation matters in explain-
ing the level of protection, aﬀecting also the interplay between inequality and protection.
Finally, there is evidence that the overall model holds up better in democracies than in
dictatorships.
Summing up, the empirical ﬁndings reinforce the idea that it is the public and private
institutions that, through their action on the incentive structure, provide the critical ele-
ments in the policy-making process. The formulation and implementation of sound eco-
nomic policies can only be achieved through a better understanding of the interplay
between policy variables and institutions. From this perspective, this paper has highlighted
the important role played by land inequality and political ideology on agricultural
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Countries and time period covered
1 Argentina 1982–1992 21 Mexico 1982–2000
2 Australia 1982–2000 22 New Zealand 1982–2000
3 Austria 1982–1994 23 Nigeriaa 1982–1989
4 Bangladesha 1982–1987 24 Norway 1982–2000
5 Brazil 1982–1987 25 Pakistan 1982–1987
6 Canada 1982–2000 26 Poland 1986–2000
7 Chile 1987–1992 27 Senegal 1982–1989
8 China 1984–1992 28 Slovakia 1986–2000
9 Colombia 1982–1992 29 Slovenia 1986–2000
10 Czech Republic 1986–2000 30 South Africa 1982–1989
11 Egypta 1982–1992 31 Sweden 1982–1994
12 European Union 1982–2000 32 Switzerland 1982–2000
13 Finland 1982–1994 33 Taiwan 1982–1987
14 Hungary 1986–2000 34 Tanzania 1982–1989
15 India 1982–1990 35 Thailand 1982–1987
16 Indonesiaa 1982–1987 36 Turkey 1982–2000
17 Jamaica 1982–1989 37 USA 1982–2000
18 Japan 1982–1992 38 Venezuela 1982–1987
19 Kenyaa 1982–1989 39 Zambia 1982–1991
20 Korea 1982–2000 40 Zimbabwea 1982–1989
a Countries, where gov_ideology variable is not classiﬁable.References
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